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Abstract 
When facing threats from automation, a worker residing in a large Chinese city might 
not be as lucky as a worker in a large U.S. city, depending on the type of large city in 
which one resides. Empirical studies found that large U.S. cities exhibit resilience to 
automation impacts because of the increased occupational and skill specialization. 
However, in this study, we observe polarized responses in large Chinese cities to 
automation impacts. The polarization might be attributed to the elaborate master 
planning of the central government, through which cities are assigned with different 
industrial goals to achieve globally optimal economic success and, thus, a fast-growing 
economy. By dividing Chinese cities into two groups based on their administrative 
levels and premium resources allocated by the central government, we find that Chinese 
cities follow two distinct industrial development trajectories: one trajectory owning 
government support leads to a diversified industrial structure and, thus, a diversified 
job market, and the other leads to specialty cities and, thus, a specialized job market. 
By revisiting the automation impacts on a polarized job market, we observe a 
Simpson’s paradox through which a larger city of a diversified job market results in 
greater resilience, whereas larger cities of specialized job markets are more susceptible. 
These findings inform policy makers to deploy appropriate policies to mitigate the 
polarized automation impacts. 
One Sentence Summary: China’s top-down, centrally planned specialization of cities 
makes large Chinese cities less resilient to impact from automation technologies. 
  
1 Introduction 
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics technologies have revived the 
concerns of technological unemployment. Frey and Osborne (1) estimated that more 
than 47% of U.S. jobs were at high risk of computerization, and an alternative OECD 
study (2) found a more modest 9% of U.S. jobs were at risk. Based on the method in 
(1), Frey et al. (3) expected the impacts on China’s job market to be devastating and 
accounted for 77% of employment at risk, or approximately 550 million jobs (4). Even 
though these figures are highly disputed, they foresee unavoidable impacts on the global 
job market for the upcoming decades. China is at the precipice of becoming a developed 
economy, and this stage could reflect the greatest income inequality (5) and resource 
accessibility (6). The impacts on the job market would certainly exacerbate the 
inequality, and the resulting destabilization would be a significant problem for not just 
China but also the world.  
The expected impacts on China’s job market are significantly greater than those on 
OECD countries (3). This result could stem from differences in economic structures. 
China has become the world’s factory, receiving manufacturing orders from around the 
world; at the same time, increasing domestic demand has elevated its manufacturing 
capacities. However, jobs in the manufacturing sector are among the most susceptible 
to automation (1). Moreover, to secure food safety for almost 1.4 billion people, a 
significant labor force is in the farming sectors, occupations of which are also 
susceptible to automation. Both aggravate the overall impact on China’s job market.  
The rapid urbanization that has developed megacities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Shenzhen, has allowed China to remedy the economic gaps to the developed world. 
Whereas China’s cities accommodate more than half its population (4), the impacts 
from automation at the city level in China have never been studied. Frank et al. (7) 
found that large U.S. cities are more resilient to the impacts of automation because 
increasing numbers of specialized occupations and skills that are resilient to automation 
were observed, along with the growing size. Given that China’s cities also express 
similar scaling behavior in productivity and R&D employment (8), we also expect the 
resilience of China’s large cities. We estimate job impact rates for 102 cities in China 
based on the method in (1) (see the Results for details) and found polarized responses 
along with the growing size; some large cities are also estimated to be susceptible to 
automation (Fig. 1). For example, Nanyang, the fifth largest city in China, is famous 
for its farming produce, has 79% employment in the primary industry and is estimated 
to have 83% jobs at risk. These “specialty cities” in which only one or a few industries 
dominate, could be explained as the legacy of China’s planned economy, and the central 
government assigned specific development targets to different regions (9). After the 
economic reform, regional governments gain greater autonomy in choosing industrial 
strategies. For example, between 2016 and 2017, the central government approved 403 
local government applications to initiate “specialty towns”—focused on one particular 
industry—and aims to have 1,000 of them by 2020 (10). However, given the regional 
endowments and the central government’s preferences, China’s cities have developed 
a polarized industrial structure over increasing city size, for which some regions 
adapted a more diversified industrial structure, similar to U.S. cities (11), but some 
adapted a path-dependent development trajectory (12) to become “specialty cities”. 
Given industrial polarization, China’s cities develop a polarized job market. Therefore, 
this study aims to understand the emerging impacts from automation technologies on 
China’s polarized job market. 
2 Materials and Methods 
2.1 Estimation of job impacts in China  
To utilize the estimated job impact rate of (1), we build a correspondence table between 
China’s Grand Classification of Occupations (GCO) and the U.S.’s Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC). There are 8 chapters, 66 sections, and 413 
subsections of occupations in the GCO. The GCO’s 413 subsectional occupations are 
mapped to one or multiple occupations from 702 SOC 6-digits occupations based on 
the titles and corresponding descriptions. The matching process is as follows. 
(1) Three paid students (𝑁 = 3) with backgrounds in human geography mapped 
GCO subsectional occupations (𝐽 = 413) to as many SOC 6-digits occupations 
( 𝐾 = 702 ) as appropriate based on titles and corresponding descriptions, 
respectively. This step generates an array of mappings for individual GCO 
occupations: 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐶𝑂(𝑗) ∈ 𝑅
702 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 , where 𝑅  is a vector with 
element 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑂𝐶(𝑘) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 . The value of 
𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑂𝐶  indicates the number of occurrences of such an occupation as 
mapped by students.  
(2) If a GCO occupation has all candidates 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑂𝐶 ≤ 1 , the authors 
decided on the SOC to which that occupation should be mapped, the 
corresponding 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑂𝐶 ← 1, and the rest 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑂𝐶 ← 0.  
(3) The commonly matched SOC occupations (𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑂𝐶 ≥ 2) are kept and 
the corresponding value is changed 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑂𝐶 ← 1 , and the rest 
𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑂𝐶 ← 0. The final output of the correspondence table is a matrix 
𝑅413×702, in which each element is 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑂𝐶 ∈ {0,1}. 
We cannot find a mapping for occupations in the “leader of political or state-owned 
entities” SOC sector; therefore, we assign a zero impact rate for them given the special 
nature of this type of occupation. Subsequently, we compute the mean impact rate of 
all 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑂𝐶 =  1 and assign the mean value as the computerization probability 
to the corresponding GCO occupations.  
The Sixth National Population Census (hereafter referred to as the Census) carried out 
by the National Bureau of Statistics of China in 2010 identifies the employment 
distribution of 413 subsectional occupations and 95 industrial subsectors across 295 
cities (metropolitan areas). However, only 102 city governments make this Census 
available in paper form, which we converted into electronic form.  
Industry, job, and impact rate: industry and job diversity are computed using 
normalized Shannon entropy (29), as follows. Normalized Shannon entropy has been 
used in urban science (7, 30). 
𝐻𝑗𝑜𝑏(𝑚) =  − ∑ [𝑝𝑚(𝑗) × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑚(𝑗))]/𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑚)𝑗∈𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑚      [2] 
𝐻𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦(𝑚)  =  − ∑ [𝑝𝑚(𝑘) × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑚(𝑘))]/𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑚)𝑘∈𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑚
 [3] 
𝑝𝑚(𝑗) denotes the probability of a worker in city 𝑚 having job 𝑗, 𝑝𝑚(𝑘) denotes 
the probability of a worker in city 𝑚 working in industry 𝑘, and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑚 is the 
set of industry sectors in city 𝑚. In the computation of job diversity 𝐻𝑗𝑜𝑏(𝑚), we use 
𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑚 ∈ 413 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑠 , and in the computation of industry diversity 
𝐻𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦(𝑚), we use 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑚 ∈  95 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠. 
To estimate the relationships among city size, job diversity, industry diversity, distance 
to the closest elite cities, net population gains, fixed asset investments, and impact rate, 
we build linear regression models and estimate the coefficients using the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method. The response variable and predictor can be one of the 
previously listed variables, and the predictor can be log-transformed. If the predictor is 
log-transformed, it is explicitly addressed in the caption of the corresponding figure. 𝛽 
reports the coefficient of the predator. To estimate the scaling behavior of occupation 
growth, we build a linear regression with a log-log transformation. 𝛽  reports the 
scaling exponents. 
2.2 China’s higher education system and bullet trains  
By 2010, 39 and 109 universities have been funded by projects “985” and “211,” 
respectively (some are funded by both concurrently). The data are available from the 
official website of the Ministry of Education of China: 
http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A03/moe_634/.  
Another significant investment devoted to Chinese cities is the bullet trains railway 
network. The daily operating frequency of bullet trains in each city can be found at the 
online bullet train ticket office: http://www.gaotie.cn/. Both university and bullet train 
statistics are available in Table. S1. 
2.3 Occupation space 
We adapt the methodology from (22) to construct the occupation space. 
Revealed comparative advantage (RCA): 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑚,𝑗 measures, for city 𝑚, occupation 
𝑗’s relative level to the national average. 𝑥𝑚,𝑗 is the total number of jobs of occupation 
𝑗 in city 𝑚. When 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑚,𝑗 > 1, city 𝑚 has more jobs of occupation 𝑗 as a share of 
its total numbers of jobs than the national average, and vice versa. An occupation with 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑚,𝑗 > 1 is considered one of the city’s advantaged occupations. 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑚,𝑗 = (𝑥𝑚,𝑗/𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑚 )/(𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑚 / ∑ 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑚 𝑚 )     [4] 
Proximity: The proximity between two occupations 𝑖 and 𝑗, denoted as 𝜙𝑖,𝑗, is the 
minimum of the pairwise conditional probabilities of a city accommodates an 
occupation given that it also accommodates another. A closer proximity indicates a 
higher correlation between two occupations and a closer spacing of the two occupation 
nodes in the occupation space (Fig. 4a). The value of 𝜙𝑖,𝑗 is between 0 and 1. 
𝜙𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑃𝑟(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑚,𝑖 ≥ 1|𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑚,𝑗 ≥ 1), 𝑃𝑟(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑚,𝑗 ≥ 1|𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑚,𝑖 ≥ 1)} 
 [5] 
National occupation space. First, we construct a 413 * 413 occupation proximity matrix. 
Second, we generate a maximum spanning tree (MST) based on the proximity matrix 
to generate the network’s skeleton and complement it with additional proximity links 
whose 𝜙𝑖,𝑗  >  0.66. For better visualization, we use a force spring layout to visualize 
the network. 
3 Result 
3.1 The impacts of automation 
We estimated the impacts of automation on China’s job market at the city level using 
[1] as adapted from (7). 
𝐸𝑚 =
∑ 𝑝𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜(𝑗)⋅𝑓𝑚(𝑗)𝑗∈𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑚
∑ 𝑓𝑚(𝑗)𝑗∈𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑠
       [1] 
𝐸𝑚 is the expected job impact rate for city 𝑚, 𝑓𝑚(𝑗) denotes the number of workers 
in city 𝑚 with job 𝑗, and 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑚  is the set of job types in city 𝑚. 𝑝𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜(𝑗), the 
probability of computerization for job 𝑗 is adopted from (1). On average, 79% of jobs 
are expected to be at high risk for 102 cities in China, which is close to the estimation 
of (3) (see Table. S1 for estimations for all 102 cities). Well-known large cities, such 
as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, exhibit resilience to automation 
technologies, with expected impact rates of 64%, 67%, 69%, and 72%, respectively, 
whereas other large cities such as Zhumadian and Nanyang are the opposite, both with 
job impacts as high as 83% (Fig. 1). Different from the findings of (7), city size does 
not express strong correlations over job impacts as a whole.   
Susceptible large cities have long been regarded as “specialty cities”, which are either 
specialized in farming (e.g., Nanyang), mining (e.g., Pingdingshan), or manufacturing 
(e.g., Taizhou), whereas resilient large cities are either innovation hubs (e.g., Beijing) 
or financial (e.g., Shanghai) or regional services centers (e.g., Guangzhou). The former 
industrial sectors tend to employ jobs of higher computerization risks, whereas the 
opposite is true for the latter. The underlying industrial structure might constitute 
distinct job market and, as a result, cause Chinese cities’ polarized responses to 
automation impacts. Therefore, it is worth studying the relationships between each of 
them.  
3.2 Polarized job market  
To understand China’s industrial structure, we perform a principal component analysis 
(PCA) (13) on the employment distributions across 20 industrial sectors (see Fig. 2). 
PCA has been used in urban science (14, 15). The PCA result shows that two leading 
principal components (PCs) accumulate more than 85% of the total variances. 
Therefore, by analyzing two PCs’ industrial employment compositions and cities’ PC 
scores, one can address China’s industrial structure. A group of vectors consisting of 
tertiary industries pointing in the 9 o’clock direction on PC1 corresponds to the 
coexistence of the tertiary industries in the same set of cities. However, farming and 
mining both have minor contributions regarding PC1 but significant regarding PC2, 
indicating that both industries tend to co-locate but dislocate to the tertiary industries. 
Manufacturing contributes to both PCs but affects inversely against farming and mining 
regarding PC2. Thus, from the composition of PCs, we can claim two PCs as a servicing 
index and a natural resources index, respectively. Cities’ positions on this plot unveil 
their industrial structure. For example, Beijing and Shanghai have significant servicing 
but minor natural resources’ indexing scores, addressing their advantages in servicing 
roles in the Chinese economy. In this plot, two types of large cities clearly emerge. One 
type is servicing centers and the other type is natural resources centers, which also 
correspond to two types of large cities that face polarized automation impacts. 
Interestingly, if we set one of the smallest cities in this study, Sanya, as the starting 
point, we can observe that cities tend to follow two trajectories toward those two 
extreme industrial structures, along with increasing size (dashed vectors in Fig. 2). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has addressed Chinese cities’ polarized 
industrial path-taking behavior; therefore, this study also attempts to understand its 
underlying driving forces. The color codes of cities in Fig. 2 will be subsequently 
addressed.  
The distinct industrial trajectories could have been elaborately planned for decades by 
the central government to achieve global optima of economic success. However, given 
the lack of historical planning materials, we cannot investigate how cities’ or regions’ 
missions were assigned. Instead, we can infer the central government’s master plan 
toward each city by studying the spatial allocations of premium resources or, to be more 
specific, the research facilities and transport infrastructure. To develop innovation 
capabilities and international competitiveness, China launched two national education 
projects—“985” and “211”—in the 1990s to enable a limited number of universities to 
become world-class research facilities (16). As a result, these premium research 
facilities have significantly improved the innovation competitiveness of corresponding 
cities (17). By 2010, 113 universities have been funded by the “985” and “211” projects.  
Another significant premium resource is the bullet train railway network invested in 
and managed by the central government. The allocation of bullet train stations and the 
operating frequency address the importance of a corresponding city as the regional 
service center, such as a freight forwarder. Moreover, bullet trains also exhibited strong 
effects in the overall competitiveness of a city (18). In this study, we use daily operating 
frequency of the bullet train as a proxy for infrastructure investments by the central 
government (see Materials and Methods for more details about the Chinese higher 
education system and bullet train distributions). Using k-means clustering (𝑘 = 2) on 
those two features, two groups of cities were found, and we name them premium 
(𝑁𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 20) and non-premium cities (𝑁𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚 = 82). 
It is not a complete surprise that the majority of premium cities are direct-controlled 
municipalities, sub-provincial level municipalities, or provincial capitals. These cities 
enjoy administrative powers over their peers. One of the exclusive advantages is direct 
communications with the central government; therefore, state-owned and multinational 
companies prefer to reside in them to reduce communication costs and to stay informed 
of volatile policies and regulations. Fixed asset investments can be a good proxy for 
addressing the preferences of those companies. Fig. S1 shows that fixed asset 
investments grow linearly with city size in premium cities and cities of higher 
administrative power, whereas they grow sub-linearly in non-premium cities and cities 
of lower administrative power. The administrative levels of each city were successively 
imposed by the central government after the 1950s until the 1990s. Therefore, because 
this long-lasting administrative division might also unveil the master planning of the 
government over the past decades, we also group cities by their administrative levels 
and call them elite and non-elite cities. In this study, there are a total of 19 elite and 83 
non-elite cities. Among them, 16 elite and 4 non-elite cities appear on the list of 
premium cities (see Table. S1 for the full list of both division systems).  
In Fig. 1b and Fig. 1c, we find that both large premium and elite cities exhibit resilience 
to automation impacts relative to the others. Moreover, we observe a Simpson’s 
paradox (19), for which the larger cities on the advantaged side (premium and elite) 
have greater resilience to automation impacts; additionally, the larger cities on the non-
advantaged side are more susceptible. In this paradox, small non-advantaged cities 
(non-premium and non-elite) are resilient to automation impacts, which is opposite of 
the findings for the United States (7). We also compare city size effects between 
Chinese and U.S. cities (see Fig. S2). Even though the overall impact in China is 
significantly higher than in the United States, Chinese cities on the advantaged sides 
exhibit stronger size effects than U.S. cities (|𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚| > |𝛽𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒| > |𝛽𝑈𝑆|). Therefore, 
cities enjoying more premium resources or higher administrative power help mitigate 
the automation impacts to a great extent.    
In Fig. 2, along with the two distinct industrial trajectories that we hypothesized, 
premium cities tend to develop a more diversified industrial structure along with 
increasing size, which is similar to U.S. cities (11), whereas non-premium cities are 
adapted to be specialized in either farming and mining or manufacturing. Even though 
we cannot investigate how cities are assigned with specific missions given the lack of 
historical planning materials, we can infer from the previous finding that the central 
government has put in force two distinct industrial strategies over these two types of 
cities. Given that China started its reform as a poor country, to achieve a fast-growing 
economy, limited premium resources can only be deployed in a few trailblazer cities 
and become innovation hubs and financial and regional services centers. The other 
cities might need to specialize in a few industries to benefit from the scale economies 
(20). Thus, global optima of economic success can be achieved. Moreover, we also find 
that non-advantaged cities tend to develop a more diversified industrial structure when 
they are geographically close to elite cities (Fig. S3). This might aggravate polarization 
because both innovations and diversified job markets exist in elite cities (see Fig. 3a). 
Skilled and well-educated workers tend to migrate to these cities to earn higher wages 
(21) and, as a result, non-advantaged cities farther from elite cities have lower chances 
of attracting those workers. Therefore, because “specialty cities” might lack skilled and 
well-educated workers to develop high-tech industries, they continue to specialize in 
low-tech industries, such as farming and mining. We confirm the population loss of 
non-advantaged cities along with the growing distance to the closest elite cities (Fig. 
S4). We use the distance to the closest elite cities instead of to the premium cities 
because elite cities are more geographically distributed than premium cities (mainly 
located in eastern China), and non-premium cities in western China could benefit more 
from their elite neighbors than distant premium cities in eastern China. Moreover, the 
distance computation involves not just the elite cities in this study but also those beyond 
this study given the lack of detailed census records.   
Because a diversified industrial structure constitutes a diversified job market and vice 
versa (strong correlation between both are observed in Fig. S5), polarized job diversities 
of two groups of cities over city size is also observed (Fig. 3a). There are some large 
non-premium cities also developing diversified job market, such as Taizhou. Those 
cities might have been taking similar industrial trajectories as those of premium cities, 
given that they are closer than their peers to diversified elite cities. More importantly, 
we find that job diversity significantly affects expected job impacts (Fig. 3b). Similar 
to findings in the United States (7), a diversified job market can mitigate automation 
impacts to a great extent. 
By studying occupation growth over city size, we can understand how job market 
composition affects the expected job impact rate (see Figs. 3c & 3d, and see Fig. S6 for 
results under the administrative division). The distinct occupation growth patterns of 
premium and non-premium cities show that, in non-premium cities, susceptible 
occupations (e.g., primary industry, production, and construction) grow super-linearly 
with city size. In contrast, they grow either sub-linearly, linearly, or even negatively 
with city size in premium cities. The most resilient occupations, such as public services, 
quality checks and measurements, professionals, and film and music, are among the 
most distinct scaling exponents between premium and non-premium cities.  
3.3 Evolution of occupational structure 
The product space of Hidalgo et al. (22) offers a compelling illustration that addresses 
the relationships between world trade products and the roles played by different 
countries. In the product space, products are connected based on their co-location 
probability, and the core area consists of sophisticated products such as metal products, 
machinery, and chemicals, whereas the periphery consists of fishing, tropical, and 
cereal agriculture. Industrialized countries are found to be dominant in exporting 
products in the core area, whereas non-industrialized ones are dominant in the periphery. 
Also, empirically proven was that one developing country can traverse through links of 
the network to the core area to gain relative advantages with some sophisticated 
products, which can later constitute the base of further traversing and, thus, 
industrialization. Inspired by the product space, we hypothesize that advantaged cities 
grow to be hubs of innovation, finance, arts, and services, and become service centers 
for surrounding non-advantaged cities that develop into “specialty cities” given the 
master planning of the central government. Therefore, we construct the first occupation 
space for China based on the co-location probability of any two occupations (Fig. 4 and 
see Materials and Methods for the detailed process).  
Similar to the occupation space of the United States (23), China’s occupation space also 
has a service sector and professional occupations in the core area and production and 
farming at the periphery (Fig. 4a). Moreover, occupations at the core express resilience 
to the impacts of automation, whereas occupations at the periphery tend to be 
susceptible to automation (Fig. 4b).  
To illustrate the dominance of cities in certain parts of the occupation space, we 
highlight a few symbolic cities based on their relative advantages. Beijing (Fig. 5b) is 
dominant in the professional sector at the core, whereas the small premium city of 
Putian (Fig. 5a), known as the “shoes-making city”, is dominant in the production sector 
at the periphery. The large non-premium city Nanyang (Fig. 5e) is dominant in 28 
occupations, mainly in farming and production at the periphery, whereas the small, non-
premium city of Sanya (Fig. 5d), known as the tourist city, is dominant in the service 
sector at the core. We observe two distinct evolution paths of the job market for both 
premium and non-premium cities (Fig. 5c): premium cities transit from the periphery 
to the core and the non-premium cities transit in the opposite direction. This confirms 
that premium cities grow to be services centers, whereas non-premium cities grow to 
become “specialty cities”. Polarization might achieve economic optima for China as a 
whole; however, in the context of technological unemployment, it might cause 
significant threats to non-advantaged cities and inequality for the entire job market.  
4 Limitations 
We can only access the census data for 102 cities, which were made available to the 
public by the local governments. Even though they are geographically distributed and 
have different sizes and GDPs, they are just above one-third of the entire population, 
that is, 295 cities. In this regard, audiences should be cautious in using the conclusions 
drawn from this limited number of city samples. 
Similar to (7), many limitations inherent in occupation-level estimations apply to this 
study as well. Moreover, China lacks statistics on skill and task distributions across 
occupations, and we cannot perform the task-based approach (2) in estimating the 
jobs impact in this study. The job impacts in China could be significantly weaker than 
the estimation by (3) and this study. Therefore, policy makers are encouraged to 
interpret the impact rates as relative values for comparing the impacts between cities. 
5 Discussion 
The automation impacts on the job market has never been as tensional as it is today. 
The main concern is that the loss of jobs to automation could outstrip the demand 
created by the corresponding increasing productivity (24). Appropriate policies should 
be deployed to help mitigate rapid changes to the job market. However, an 
understanding of the emerging changes at the city level has never been studied for the 
most populous country, China. This study attempts to compute the job impacts for 
112 Chinese cities and addresses the reasons behind the polarized responses over 
increasing city size.  
Given a lack of access to historical planning materials, we cannot investigate how 
missions were assigned to each city. However, by grouping cities based on their 
administrative level and allocation of premium resources, we find two distinct industrial 
development trajectories among them that unveil the central government’s master 
planning regarding the pursuit of the global optima of economic success. China’s 
polarized industrial structure has constituted a polarized job market in which 
susceptible occupations appear more in non-advantaged cities and resilient occupations 
strive in advantaged cities and, accordingly, polarize responses to the emerging 
automation impacts. Moreover, non-advantaged cities can benefit significantly from 
their neighbor advantaged cities of a diversified industrial structure, which might 
further exaggerate the polarization of automation impacts. In all, sufficient grounds 
exist to believe that cities’ lack of administrative power or premium resources and 
distance from advantaged cities could be left behind in the second machine age (24).  
Up-skills would be one of the most feasible ways to mitigate automation impacts (25) 
but involve appropriate allocation of educational resources, especially for lifelong 
learning. We find that China’s existing allocation of educational resources might not 
match where they are needed the most (Figs. S7 & S8). The growth of vocational 
teachers and vocational schools are linearly and sub-linearly correlated with size in non-
advantaged cities, respectively. However, because large, non-advantaged cities could 
suffer the most from automation impacts, vocational education facilities should at least 
super-linearly grow to the city size in non-advantaged cities. Thus, the central 
government should play an important role in motivating or subsidizing appropriate 
policies to support vocational education where it is most needed.  
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to explore the city division system 
in China and to find the polarization of industrial structure and the job market. The city 
division system could change urban research in planned economies (e.g., scaling laws 
(8) and agglomeration economies (26)) given that non-advantaged cities have not been 
following organic growth, whereas advantaged cities enjoy the fruits of their non-
advantaged peers. Empirical studies tend to investigate cities as an entire population 
and might overlook the fundamental differences between organic and planned 
economies. For example, in (26), China was found to exhibit smaller estimates of urban 
agglomeration elasticities than other countries. However, we might expect a different 
finding when Chinese cities are treated in a two-study population. Two distinct urban 
scaling exponents were found between eastern and western Europe (27); therefore, we 
believe that it is worth revisiting scaling laws in China using this city division.   
Indeed, journalists and even expert commentators have successfully portrayed 
technological unemployment as an unsettling picture of the future of work. However, 
most overlook the complementarities between automation and labor. As Autor (28) 
addressed, automation does substitute tasks but also increases productivity and earnings 
and, as a result, augments higher demand for labor. In China, the future research about 
the complementarities should take into account the polarized job market. 
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Fig. 1. Expected job impact rate over city size. (a) Geographical distributions of 
expected job impact from automation across China’s cities. Premium cities are marked 
with red stars. (b) and (c) Expected job impact rate over city size. In (b), cities are 
grouped using k-means clustering according to the educational resources and transport 
infrastructures funded by the central government. In (c), cities are grouped based on 
their administrative levels. We build linear regression models using 𝑙𝑜𝑔10(𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) 
as instrumental variables and job impact rate as responses. The estimations of the size 
effects are presented in the inset table. In the model, city size is log-transformed and 
does not correlate with job impacts as a whole (𝑝𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.86), but does within groups.  
 
Fig. 2. China’s industrial structure obtained from PCA on the employment 
distributions across 20 industry sectors. The solid vectors represent the coefficients 
of industrial employments on the PCs, the nodes represent cities’ corresponding PC 
scores, and the dashed vectors starting from Sanya indicate two arbitrary directions that 
illustrate how small cities transform its industrial structure along with increasing size. 
The size of the nodes is proportional to the city size. Two leading PCs explain 78.7% 
and 6.3% of the overall variances, respectively. Two eclipses show the 95% confidence 
interval (CI) of PC scores of corresponding cities. 
 
  
Fig. 3. Job diversity, impact rate, and occupation growth between premium and 
non-premium cities. (a) Job diversity over city size. The node size is proportional to 
the distance to the closest elite cities. (b) Expected job impact rates over job diversity. 
The node size is proportional to the city size. Linear regression results are shown in the 
tables. City size is log-transformed in the model. Panels (c) and (d) show occupation 
growth over city size in non-premium and premium cities, respectively. Points are 
vertically shifted according to linear fit in a log scale and the black dashed line has a 
slope of 1 for reference.  
 
Fig. 4. Occupation space across 102 Chinese cities. Panel (a) shows the occupation 
space; panel (b) shows the relationship between an occupation’s closeness centrality 
and automation rate. The dashed line indicates the best fit of the linear regression, which 
reports a negative relationship between both.  
 
  
Fig. 5. Evolution of positions in occupation space along with growing size. (a), (b), 
(d), and (e) represent the positions of Putian, Beijing, Sanya, and Nanyang in the 
occupation space. (c) represents two distinct evolution paths of premium and non-
premium cities in the occupation space. The result of the linear regression model is 
presented in the inset table, and city size is log-transformed. 
 
Supplementary Materials  
 
Fig. S1. The fixed asset investments over city size. Panel (a) shows result under the 
resources division and (b) the administrative division. The result of the linear regression 
is presented in tables, and the predictor city size is log-transformed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. S2. The comparison of expected job impact rate across Chinese and US cities. 
The predictor city size is log-transformed. The job impact rate and city size are obtained 
from (7). 
 
  
Fig. S3. Industry diversity over the distance to the closest elite cities. (a) The 
resources division, (b) The administrative division. The predictor distance to closest 
elite city is log-transformed.  
 
  
Fig. S4. Population net gain over the distance to the closest elite cities. (a) The 
resources division, (b) The administrative division. The predictor distance to closest 
elite city is log-transformed.  
 
  
Fig. S5. Job diversity over industry diversity. (a) The resources division, (b) The 
administrative division. 
 
  
 Fig. S6. Job growth over city size between elite and non-elite cities. 
 
  
Fig. S7. Allocations of vocational education resources over city size under the 
premium resources division. (a) the vocational teachers grow superlinearly in 
premium cities and linearly in non-premium cities. (b) the vocational schools grow 
sublinearly in both premium and non-premium cities. 
 
  
Fig. S8. Allocations of vocational education resources over city size under the 
administrative division. (a) the vocational teachers grow linearly in non-elite cities 
and sublinearly in elite cities. (b) the vocational schools grow sublinearly in both elite 
and non-elite cities. 
 
 
  
Table S1. China’s cities division system. The numbers of universities under projects 
‘211’ and ‘985’ and the daily operating frequency of bullet trains are shown in 
column 2, 3, 6, and 7. The estimation of job impact rate are shown in column 4 and 8. 
City Universities 
Count 
Bullet 
Trains 
Expected  
Job Impact 
Rate 
City Universities 
Count 
Bullet 
Trains 
Expected  
job impact 
rate 
Yibin 0 0 81.99% Puyang 0 0 81.09% 
Luzhou 0 0 81.26% Kaifeng 0 58 82.60% 
Lhasa1 1 0 77.95% Zhumadian 0 93 83.65% 
Heihe 0 0 73.94% Luohe 0 97 79.15% 
Beijing1,2 35 349 63.83% Pingdingsha
n 
0 0 79.52% 
Shanghai1,2 10 372 67.16% Sanmenxia 0 64 75.81% 
Tianjin1,2 3 261 70.78% Zhengzhou1,
2 
1 230 72.23% 
Shenzhen1,2 0 246 72.05% Lanzhou1 2 112 70.23% 
Guangzhou1,
2 
4 377 69.26% Qingyang 0 0 82.05% 
Foshan2 0 148 71.83% Qingdao1 1 67 74.17% 
Zhuhai 0 80 65.44% Weihai 0 46 76.16% 
Huizhou 0 131 77.24% Jinan1,2 1 248 73.73% 
Jiangmen 0 15 71.72% Dongying 0 0 75.48% 
Kunming1 0 73 72.91% Liaocheng 0 0 81.29% 
Yuncheng 0 43 75.35% Linyi 0 0 79.97% 
Changzhi 0 0 77.47% Tai'an 0 0 77.81% 
Linfen 0 58 77.83% Dezhou 0 124 82.42% 
Lvliang 0 0 77.12% Binzhou 0 0 80.74% 
Shuozhou 0 0 76.28% Chizhou 0 53 77.40% 
Jincheng 0 0 76.40% Bengbu2 0 143 80.58% 
Xinzhou 0 0 79.92% Suzhou 0 88 78.97% 
Yangquan 0 39 72.39% Tongling 0 95 72.05% 
Taiyuan1 0 69 67.44% Huainan 0 45 73.86% 
Jinzhong 0 18 75.79% Huaibei 0 0 76.11% 
Nanjing1,2 8 335 69.02% Huangshan 0 49 72.15% 
Yancheng 0 0 79.67% Liu'an 0 71 80.49% 
Xuzhou2 1 273 78.07% Xuancheng 0 0 78.19% 
Taizhou 0 48 76.06% Haozhou 0 0 83.37% 
Chifeng 0 0 79.84% Hefei1,2 2 213 73.89% 
Suizhou 0 26 81.54% Fangchengg
ang 
0 7 79.50% 
Shiyan 0 4 79.24% Liuzhou 0 128 77.70% 
Shaoxing2 0 168 74.06% Guigang 0 111 82.99% 
Jiaxing2 0 184 73.61% Ningde 0 56 71.40% 
Huzhou2 0 144 76.27% Zhangzhou 0 0 70.87% 
Wenzhou2 0 148 76.53% Xiamen1,2 1 212 68.91% 
Zhoushan 0 0 73.65% Putian2 0 183 77.49% 
Lishui 0 63 69.21% Longyan 0 43 76.74% 
Quzhou 0 97 74.07% Quanzhou2 1 208 74.97% 
Taizhou 0 106 75.12% Nanping 0 75 76.41% 
Jinhua 0 46 72.58% Xi'an1,2 5 155 71.99% 
Hangzhou1,2 1 247 70.54% Yan'an 0 6 68.07% 
Ningbo1,2 1 163 73.07% Baoji 0 86 76.81% 
Luoyang 0 120 79.53% Turpan 0 31 67.66% 
Shangqiu 0 98 82.52% Jilin 0 94 78.46% 
Xinyang 0 122 81.58% Liaoyuan 0 0 81.32% 
Xuchang 0 68 80.56% Songyuan 0 0 82.01% 
Nanyang 0 4 83.33% Hengyang2 0 195 81.19% 
Xinxiang 0 75 80.48% Xiangtan 0 69 78.03% 
Hebing 0 60 76.50% Haikou1 0 57 72.10% 
Anyang 0 81 80.64% Sanya 0 51 70.71% 
Jiaozuo 0 14 78.18% Guiyang1 0 125 73.75% 
Note: Cities marked with superscript 1 and 2 are elite and premium cities respectively. 
It should be noticed that even though Lhasa isn’t counted as a premium city due to the 
lack of bullet train passing-by, its railway investments are much higher than any other 
bullet train lines (31). 
 
